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Abstract 
Homo moralis: Personal characteristics, institutions, and moral 
decision-making 
 
 
This paper studies how individual characteristics, institutions, and their interac-
tion influence moral decisions. We validate a moral paradigm focusing on the 
willingness to accept harming third parties. Consequences of moral decisions are 
real. We explore how moral behavior varies with individual characteristics and 
how these characteristics interact with market institutions compared to situa-
tions of individual decision-making. Intelligence, female gender, and the exist-
ence of siblings positively influence moral decisions, in individual and in market 
environments. Yet in markets, most personalities tend to follow overall much 
lower moral standards. Only fluid intelligence specifically counteracts moral-
eroding effects of markets. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper explores the relationship between individual characteristics, institutions and 
moral behavior, focusing on the willingness to accept harming third parties. 
Consequences of moral decisions are real. We study how moral behavior varies with 
individual characteristics and how these characteristics interact with institutions, 
comparing individual situations to market environments. We find that generally, moral 
behavior is higher for more intelligent people, females and people with siblings, and 
correlates positively with religiousness and vegetarianism. This is true for individual as 
well as for market situations. Therefore, a moral personality, a homo moralis, seems to 
exist – a personality that tends to follow higher moral standards compared to others. 
In markets, moral values are overall much lower than in individual decision-making. 
Homo moralis characteristics help keeping higher moral standards, and high fluid 
intelligence even has an over-proportionally protecting impact, helping people to keep 
exceptionally high moral standards in an overall morals-eroding institution. 
Investigating the influence of individual characteristics on levels of morality is an 
interesting topic in itself. Yet it is also of political relevance. Depending on what kind of 
moral outcome organizations aim to implement, they may target people with specific 
individual characteristics. Such targeted subgroups could be males or females, the old 
or the young, people of high or low intelligence, the rich or the poor. Individual 
characteristics may play important roles in committee-decisions on morally relevant 
questions, thereby affecting ethical judgments of various boards. Likewise, work ethics 
may be shaped by what kind of personalities run a company. If a glass ceiling or other 
kinds of discrimination prevent certain subgroups, e.g. females, from climbing job 
ladders, business ethics of a company could suffer. On a broader level, societies may 
develop into different moral directions depending on whether socio-demographics 
matter for political representation or not. 
Research in the social sciences points into the direction that moral behavior is 
malleable by institutional design.1 It can make a huge difference whether people decide 
individually about a morally relevant issue, or whether they decide in groups or as 
market participants. Falk and Szech (2013a) document that markets can cause drastic 
moral transgression, seducing people to support immoral outcomes they would 
individually object to. Kirchler et al. (forthcoming) confirm this effect, and demonstrate 
its robustness for a variety of institutional details. The findings raise the question where 
markets are morally appropriate, and in which form. The debate of markets and 
morality has recently received much attention (Sandel 2012; Satz 2010). If markets 
erode moral standards, discussing policy interventions may become important. 
Little to nothing is known about a potential heterogeneity in institutional effects on 
moral behavior. Do markets affect all kinds of individuals in comparable ways, or do 
certain characteristics in humans render them more or less prone to influences of 
market activity? Understanding which individuals are specifically tempted by markets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 For a comprehensive overview of the literature, see Haidt and Kesebir (2010).  
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could inform debates on market regulation and alternative policies, such as campaigns 
targeted at specific subgroups of market participants. For example, it may require a 
high level of intelligence to understand market mechanisms in order to resist their 
effects on moral behaviors. If this is the case, policy intervention could help in making 
market forces more transparent and understandable for less reflected market 
participants. 
Previous work in the social sciences provides evidence on the relevance not only of 
institutional factors, but also of emotional and situational factors for moral decision-
making. Randomly varied emotional states, e.g., shape moral judgment in the well-
known Trolley problem (e.g., Valdesolo and DeSteno 2006) or judgment of characters 
in vignette studies (Schnall et al. 2008). The power of situational and institutional 
factors in affecting moral behaviors has been repeatedly documented in various 
contexts, e.g., in the large bystander effect literature (Darley and Latané 1968, Latané 
and Nida 1981, Fischer et al. 2011), as a consequence of authority (Milgram 1963), 
delegation (Hamman et al. 2010, Bartling and Fischbacher 2012), market institutions 
(Falk and Szech 2013a), exogenous or endogenous diffusion of pivotality (Bandura 
1977 and 1999, Falk and Szech 2013b), or other forms of “moral wriggle rooms” (Dana 
et al. 2007). While researchers have uncovered intuitive, emotional and situational 
factors, little is known, however, about the role of individual characteristics as key 
drivers of moral decision making in real situations. In this paper we therefore explore 
differences at the level of the individual as a systematic source of variation in moral 
outcomes. We study both, how individual characteristics affect the level of morality in 
general, as well as how they help explaining the effects of markets as one omnipresent 
and specifically important institution on moral behavior. 
To study the role of individual specific moral decision-making, we use a real task that is 
behaviorally relevant and incentivized. This differentiates our study from a vast 
literature in business ethics that explores the relation between morality and personal 
characteristics using questionnaires and hypothetical scenarios (see Ford and 
Richardson 1994, Loe et al. 2000, and O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005 for overviews). 
According to an almost universal conception of morality, harming third parties in an 
unjustified and intentional way is viewed as immoral.2 It is this conception of morality 
that inspired our choice paradigm. In the experiment subjects faced the decision of 
receiving money and killing versus receiving no money and saving the life of an 
animal.3 Consequences of decisions taken by subjects were implemented exactly as 
stated in the instructions of the experiment. Thus, our choice paradigm involves a 
morally demanding decision since killing an animal for money implies the intentional 
harming of a third party for purely selfish reasons. The fact that a third party is 
effectively harmed, differentiates our paradigm not only from survey-based research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Compare, e.g., Bernard, “The Definition of Morality”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Fall 2012 Edition), Zalta (ed.): “In this descriptive sense, although avoiding and preventing 
harm is common to all, “morality” can refer to codes of conduct of different societies with widely 
differing content, and still be used unambiguously.” 
3 The animals involved were so-called „surplus mice” from animal laboratories. They were bred 
for animal studies but turned out to be unnecessary. They would all have been killed without our 
research projects. See the next section for details. 
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and from staged or faked experiments, but also from experiments that involve only 
monetary consequences. 
We proceed in three steps. First, we provide evidence for convergent and 
discriminatory validity of our measure. In particular, we present evidence for 
convergent validity by showing highly significant correlations of willingness to kill the 
animal with Agreeableness (negative) and Machiavellianism (positive). Agreeableness 
is one of the five facets of the Big Five inventory and associated with a general pro-
social disposition (Graziano et al. 2007). Machiavellianism represents a tendency to be 
unemotional, and therefore able to detach oneself from morality (O’Fallon and 
Butterfield 2005, Ford and Richardson 1994). To rule out that our measure simply picks 
up e.g. a preference for animals or differences in the demand for money (discriminatory 
validity), we explore the relationship between willingness to kill and having a pet, 
professional involvement in animal experiments, and disposable monthly income. None 
of these factors is significantly correlated with our measure of morality. Our choice 
paradigm therefore not only incorporates a decision context that is informed by a 
general consensus about morality, i.e., intentionally harming a third party, it also fulfills 
the requirements for convergent and discriminatory validity. 
In a second step we study whether individual differences predict variations in moral 
decision making. We focus on four characteristics, which are plausibly exogenous to 
moral behavior: gender, intelligence (IQ), age, and being a single child. The dependent 
variable is immorality, the willingness to kill a mouse for ten euros. We find that women 
are significantly less willing to kill their mouse for money, in comparison to men. 
Likewise, more intelligent subjects show a lower propensity to kill than subjects with a 
lower IQ. Subjects without brothers or sisters are more likely to kill than other subjects. 
While there is a tendency for older subjects to kill less, the effect is small. Given the 
condensed age distribution of our student sample, however, the effect of age is most 
likely not well identified. Gender, IQ and being a single child significantly predict moral 
outcomes, both individually as well as in multivariate regressions where we also 
include additional potentially related variables. Of course, in case of gender, the 
question remains whether nature, nurture, or an interaction of the two, cause the 
results. 
Two further individual characteristics, which are likely associated with moral disposition 
but which do not allow for a straightforward causal interpretation, are religiousness and 
being a vegetarian. Religious inclinations as well as being a vegetarian are potential 
expressions of normative concerns, unless, e.g., that the decision to become a 
vegetarian is solely determined by health considerations. We therefore hypothesized 
that both facets should correlate positively with moral behavior. In multivariate 
regressions where we include the exogenous drivers of morality (gender, IQ, single 
child, and age) together with these variables, religiousness and being a vegetarian are 
significantly associated with a lower propensity to kill. In sum, our analysis reveals a 
systematic pattern of individual characteristics contributing to explain heterogeneity in 
moral behavior. The overall explained variance is about 18.0 percent4 and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 R2 refers to a linear probability model with the specification of Table 3 Column (3). 
	   5	  
observed effects are sizable. For example, relative to female subjects, male subjects 
are 12.9 percentage points5 more likely to kill a mouse. Likewise, a one standard 
deviation increase in IQ (comprising standardized measures of both, fluid and 
crystallized intelligence) reduces the likelihood of killing by 11.5 percentage points. 
Conceivably, individual characteristics not only affect the level of moral decision-
making in a given context, but also might shape the extent to which situational or 
institutional factors affect moral outcomes. In a third step, we therefore move beyond 
documenting level effects and show how individual characteristics contribute to moral 
decisions in market versus non-market situations. Markets are omnipresent in our 
societies and therefore institutions of specific importance. In the markets investigated, 
buyers and sellers negotiate prices to trade an item. Using the mouse paradigm 
described above, Falk and Szech (2013a) show that markets erode moral values: 
Significantly more subjects are willing to trade and kill their mouse in markets (double-
auctions) compared to the individual, i.e., non-market, conditions. Reanalyzing their 
data, we were interested in how individual differences affect the influence of markets 
on moral behavior. Interacting a set of individual characteristics with randomized 
market participation, we find that the moral-eroding effect of markets exists for basically 
all individuals. None of the characteristics under study protects from the moral-eroding 
effect of markets. The only exception is a specific sub-dimension of intelligence. On 
average, higher fluid intelligence shows an attenuating impact on the eroding effect. 
Although individual characteristics have a decisive impact on the level of moral 
behavior, situational or institutional factors largely uniformly affect moral decision 
making. 
The individual characteristics analyzed in this paper are of particular interest. For 
example, documenting a gender effect on moral disposition adds to the mounting 
evidence on systematic gender differences in economic preferences and behaviors, 
such as risk preferences (Dohmen et al. 2011, Croson and Gneezy 2009), social 
preferences (Croson and Gneezy 2009), egalitarianism (Andreoni and Vesterlund 
2001, Fehr et al. 2008, Croson and Gneezy 2009), competitiveness (Gneezy et al. 
2003, Niederle and Vesterlund 2007, Dohmen and Falk 2011), or overconfidence 
(Lundeberg et al. 1994, Barber and Odean 2001). A gender difference in moral 
behavior may serve as explanation why firms that are predominantly run by female 
managers tend to be more open to adopting ethical standards and products (Smith and 
Oakley 1997, Weeks et al. 1999). In a related vein, Chonko and Hunt (1985) find in a 
questionnaire-study that male managers are less morally concerned than female 
managers. Further support for higher moral standards in females comes from Barnett 
and Karson (1989) studying ethical views in insurance company employees.6 In a study 
by Jones and Gautschi (1988) focusing on MBA students, females are furthermore 
found to be less loyal to ethically questionable organizations than males. Yet again, this 
study does not involve a real moral decision task with real consequences. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Average marginal effect after Probit, see Table 3 Column (3). 
6 Additional support for gender influences on moral behavior comes from Bellizi and Hite (1989) 
looking at sales managers and executives. 
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Our findings on single children complement work showing that being a single child is 
associated with being more egocentric and less cooperative (Jiao et al. 1986). With 
regard to age, looking at findings from questionnaire studies, effects on moral behavior 
seem to be mixed. While Shafer et al. (2001), Ross and Robertson (2003) and Larkin 
(2000) find no significant effect of age on ethical decision making, Razzaque and Hwee 
(2002), Latif (2000), and Eynon et al. (1997) observe a negative relationship. In line 
with the latter studies, we find that older subjects tend to behave less morally. Yet of 
course this finding has to be handled with caution as age does not vary very much in 
our student sample. Note also that there is some evidence pointing into the other 
direction. For example, Lund (2000) and Karcher (1996) find that older participants 
tended to be more ethical in questionnaire studies. Regarding religiousness, several 
studies relying on questionnaires point into the direction that religious beliefs positively 
correlate with higher ethical standards (e.g., McNichols and Zimmerer 1985, Wagner 
and Sanders 2001, see O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005 for an overview).7 Our study 
confirms this finding in a real decision context. Rather religious participants are 
significantly less likely to agree to kill.  
To the best of our knowledge, surprisingly little research has focused on the relation 
between intelligence and moral behavior. In a study with sixth- and seventh-graders, 
Nelsen et al. (1969) find that children with a higher IQ cheat less in a resistance-to-
temptation task. In addition, they observe that more intelligent children score higher in 
a Kohlberg moral-judgment test. In a related vein, concerning IQ, we find a significant 
correlation between moral behavior and intelligence. Remarkably, fluid intelligence 
turns out to have specific “protective power”, helping subjects to resist influences of 
markets. People of higher fluid intelligence are good in solving unfamiliar problems and 
logical thinking. This may help them to understand (and therefore resist) complex 
market mechanisms.  
Our results suggest that intelligence is not only beneficial from a human capital or 
productivity perspective (e.g. Hanushek and Woessmann 2008) but also with regard to 
morality. The IQ effect is informative also from a bounded rationality perspective 
(Simon 1955). It suggests that the level of complexity associated with a given decision 
context contributes to moral transgression. Increasing complexity in daily decision-
making could therefore favor immoral outcomes, both at the individual as well as at the 
societal level. If decision-makers are tempted into immoral activities as a consequence 
of complex environments, such environments do not only harm third parties, but also 
the decision-makers themselves. Feelings of guilt and bad conscience from decisions 
considered ex-post as wrong may be reduced by offering people decision contexts that 
are easily understandable. Policies designed to highlight consequences of decision 
making, e.g., consumption decisions, may thus easily improve overall welfare. Nudges, 
information campaigns or improved choice architectures could help aligning values and 
actions (Thaler and Sunstein 2008, Johnson 2012). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Giacalone and Jurkiewicz (2003) however observe a positive correlation between spirituality 
and low standards in business ethics. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the 
experimental design, measures of individual characteristics and describes the 
validation of our measure of morality. Section 3 presents our main results on the level 
effects of individual characteristics, while section 4 discusses the effects of individual 
differences on the impact of markets on moral outcomes. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental design, measures of individual characteristics, and validation of 
morality measure  
2.1 Experimental design 
We use data from Falk and Szech (2013a) to relate moral behavior to institutions and 
personality. This study introduced the Mouse Paradigm to elicit moral decision-making: 
Subjects chose between receiving money and agreeing to kill a mouse versus 
receiving no money and saving the life of a mouse. All mice involved were so-called 
“surplus mice”. Even though perfectly healthy, these mice had turned out unnecessary 
for current animal studies. They would all have been killed following animal 
experimental protocols as keeping them alive would have been costly. The killing of 
surplus animals is a standard procedure in animal laboratories. Thus many mice that 
would have otherwise all been killed, were saved as a consequence of the experiment. 
Subjects were informed about the fact that mice were surplus mice in a post 
experimental debriefing.8  
Falk and Szech (2013a) study four main different treatments, which involve the same 
consequences for mice. Respectively two of them are individual and market 
treatments. In Individual Binary, subjects faced a simple binary choice between either 
taking 10 euros and agreeing to kill a mouse or receiving no money and saving the life 
of the mouse (n=124). In a second individual decision treatment, Individual Price-List, 
subjects faced basically the same decision context but instead of simply taking a binary 
decision, they chose for various monetary amounts between money and agreeing to kill 
versus saving the mouse (n=96). Subjects knew that one of their decisions was 
randomly drawn and implemented with all consequences. Monetary amounts increased 
from 2.50 euros to 50 euros in steps of 2.50 euros. These two individual conditions 
were contrasted with decisions from two market treatments, where each subject took 
the role of either buyer or seller. Both markets were organized as continuous double 
auction markets, either bilaterally (with one buyer and one seller, Bilateral Market) or 
multilaterally (with seven buyers and nine sellers, Multilateral Market). In both 
markets, buyers and sellers bargained over trading and killing a mouse for a total gain 
of 20 euros that the two parties could split up between themselves as negotiated. The 
seller was initially endowed with a mouse. If a buyer and a seller agreed on a price, the 
buyer received 20 euros minus the price while the seller received the price. As another 
consequence if a price was agreed upon, the mouse was traded and killed. No trader 
was forced to make a price offer. Subjects knew that each mouse that was not traded 
and killed was saved. Traders who did not conclude a trade did not earn any money in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The study was ethically approved by the University of Bonn. 
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the market. There were 10 trading rounds in both markets, one was randomly selected 
and implemented. If a seller agreed to trade for 10 euros or less, we classify him or her 
as willing to agree to kill a mouse for 10 euros (or less). Sample sizes of sellers were. 
n=36 in the bilateral, and n=54 in the multilateral double auction. Our total sample 
hence consists of 310 subjects. 
To allow for an identical measure of immoral behavior between treatments we define a 
subject as acting immorally if he or she is willing to kill a mouse for 10 euros or less. 
The variable Immorality takes value one if a subject agreed to kill a mouse for 10 euros 
or less and zero otherwise. Respective shares for our four treatment conditions are 
43% for Individual Binary, 46% for Individual Price-List, 72% for Bilateral Market and 
76% for Multilateral Market.  
2.2 Measures of individual characteristics 
As part of the experiment, all subjects answered a detailed questionnaire, including 
items on IQ, personality, socio-demographics and general values, such as 
religiousness. These measures will be used to study individual determinants of morality 
as well as the validity of our measure of morality (see below). Table 1 shows the 
descriptive statistics of all variables. In the following we describe each item in detail. 
Intelligence. Following standard procedures, we measured both fluid and crystallized 
intelligence. Fluid intelligence is associated with logical reasoning in new and unfamiliar 
situations, and general intellectual capacity. In contrast, crystallized intelligence refers 
to knowledge that has been acquired during life, e.g., the vocabulary, and is thus 
considered to be more malleable. These two components constitute general 
intelligence or IQ (Cattell 1971).  
To measure fluid intelligence we used 10 items of Raven’s Advanced Progressive 
Matrices Plus (APM). The ten items were selected to achieve maximal discriminatory 
power in a ten-minute time frame. In the APM, subjects had to choose one out of eight 
possible symbols, which fits best into the missing cell of a matrix filled with black and 
white symbols. The standardized number of correctly selected items is our measure of 
fluid intelligence. Crystallized intelligence was elicited using a vocabulary test, called 
MWT9 (Lehrl 2005). The MWT contains 37 items, which consist of five words each. Out 
of those five words, four are fake words, while only one word actually exists in the 
German language. Subjects had to indicate the correct word. The standardized number 
of correct items is our measure of crystallized intelligence. We also construct a joint 
measure of intelligence (IQ score) by adding up the standardized measures of 
crystallized and fluid intelligence.  
 
Personality. To measure personality we elicited responses to the Big Five inventory, 
as well as the Machiavellianism questionnaire. The Big Five or Five-factor model is the 
most widely used taxonomy of personality traits. It originates from the lexical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 MWT is a German abbreviation and stands for „Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenztest“ 
which translates into “Multi-option Vocabulary Intelligence Test”. 
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hypothesis of Allport and Odbert (1936), which postulates that individual differences 
are encoded in language (see Borghans et al. 2008). After years of research in this 
tradition, psychologists have arrived at a hierarchical organization of personality traits 
with five traits at the highest level. These Big Five facets, which are commonly labeled 
as openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and 
neuroticism, capture personality traits at the broadest level of abstraction. Each of the 
Big Five traits condenses several distinct and more narrowly defined traits. It has been 
argued that the bulk of items that personality psychologists have used to measure 
personality can be mapped into the Big Five taxonomy (see, e.g., Costa and McCrae 
1992). We elicited the Big Five facets using the standardized scores concerning 12 
items respectively (60 items in total) of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) of 
McCrae and Costa (1989). We are mostly interested in the facet agreeableness to test 
for convergent validity of our morality measure (see below).10	    
As another test for convergent validity of our morality measure, we elicited the 
Machiavellianism questionnaire. In personality psychology, Machiavellianism refers to 
the tendency to disentangle oneself from conventional moral norms because of a 
generally unemotional attitude. We measured the degree of a person’s 
Machiavellianism using the 20-item questionnaire of Christie and Geis (1970). On a 7-
point Likert scale, subjects had to rate how much they agree to statements like “Never 
tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so” or “One 
should take action only when sure it is morally right” (reversed). Our measure for the 
degree of Machiavellianism is the standardized score of the 20 items after having 
inverted the scales for some items so as to always have high values corresponding to 
high scores in Machiavellianism. 
Other Variables. Further individual characteristics that will be used in the analysis 
comprise the following: 
Single Child: Subjects had to indicate whether they have siblings or not. The variable 
takes the value one if subjects do not have siblings. 
Disposable income: We elicited monthly disposable income. Since the sample consists 
mainly of students, we explicitly reminded subjects to subtract possible rent costs from 
their income since for students these make up the biggest amount of fixed costs. 
Religiousness: We asked subjects to rate themselves on a Likert scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (very much) concerning how religious they are. 
Vegetarian: The variable equals one if the subject is a vegetarian and zero otherwise.11 
Having a pet: We asked subjects whether they currently own a pet. The variable takes 
value one if subjects have a pet and zero otherwise. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Table A1 in the Appendix for an analysis of all Big Five facets. 
11 There are many different definitions for being vegetarian (pesco-vegetarian, ovo-lacto-
vegetarian, etc.), and we did not explicitly ask subjects whether they were vegans. We assume 
that all these subjects opted for vegetarian. 
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Studies related to animal experiments: Subjects had to indicate whether in their field of 
study they are exposed to animal experiments (in the broadest sense). The variable 
takes value one if subjects deal with animal experiments and zero otherwise. 
   Variable Mean/Share Standard Deviation 
   
Fluid Intelligence (10 items) 5.306 1.842 
Crystalized Intelligence (37 items) 30.400 3.239 
Male 0.490 0.501 
Age (in years) 24.145 3.647 
Single Child 0.158 0.365 
Religiousness (7-point Likert scale) 3.281 1.961 
Vegetarian 0.110 0.313 
Agreeableness (12 x 5-point Likert scale) 32.268 6.404 
Machiavellianism (20 x 7-p. Likert scale) 55.165 13.453 
Disposable income (in Euro) 350.274 238.163 
Studies related to animal experiments 0.165 0.371 
Having a pet 0.384 0.487 
Observations 310 
 
  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of individual characteristics. 
 
2.3 Validation of our measure of morality 
As we have argued above our measure of morality involves the decision to kill an 
animal for purely selfish reasons, qualifying as immoral behavior according to a widely 
held conception of immorality. Before we analyze individual determinants of moral 
behavior, we provide two validation checks for our measure. The first refers to 
convergent validity, i.e., the degree to which our measure is correlated with other 
measures that are theoretically predicted to be correlated. The two measures we use 
for testing convergent validity are Agreeableness and Machiavellianism. 
Agreeableness is one of the facets of Big-5, the most widely used taxonomy of 
personality traits. It refers to a tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather 
than suspicious and antagonistic towards others. Machiavellianism describes a 
person's tendency to be unemotional, and therefore able to detach him- or herself from 
conventional morality. Convergent validity with our immorality measure would call for a 
negative correlation with Agreeableness and a positive correlation with 
Machiavellianism.12 This is what we find. Table 2 reports the respective average 
marginal effects from Probit regressions with our measure of immorality as dependent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 On the relation between self-esteem and narcissism on aggression, see Bushman and 
Baumeister (1998). 
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variable. The two coefficients for Agreeableness and Machiavellianism have the 
predicted sign and are highly significant (see columns (1) and (2)). In all estimations we 
include treatment dummies for the four experimental conditions. 
        
Average Marginal Effects (Probit) Immorality (0/1) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
    
Agreeableness (standardized) -0.106*** 
  
 
(0.028) 
  Machiavellianism (standardized) 
 
0.085*** 
 
  
(0.027) 
 Available money (standardized) 
  
0.015 
   
(0.026) 
Studies related to animal experiments 
  
-0.004 
   
(0.075) 
Having a pet 
  
0.031 
   
(0.056) 
    Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes 
        
Log likelihood -194.25 -197.22 -201.84 
Observations 310 310 310 
Table 2: Validation of morality measure. Probit regression estimates (marginal 
effects), with binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or 
less) vs. not willing to kill) as dependent variable and standard errors in parentheses. *** 
indicate significance at the 1-percent-level.  
 
A potential concern with our measure could arise if it would merely measure a 
resistance to kill a mouse for reasons unrelated to moral concerns. We therefore test 
for discriminant validity, i.e., we test whether concepts that are supposed to be 
unrelated with our measure are, in fact, unrelated. A potential candidate is disposable 
income in that subjects who dispose of more money simply find it easier to forgo 
money and save the life of a mouse. Likewise it could be argued that students who are 
professionally involved with animal research or animal experiments (such as medical 
students) perceive the decision problem as morally less relevant. Finally, we do not 
seek to measure a simple preference for animals, as expressed by having a pet at 
home. In column (3) of Table 2 we report respective marginal effects for these three 
items. It turns out that none of the items is significantly related with our measure of 
morality, neither separately nor jointly (Wald test: p=0.891). In sum the results from 
Table 2 confirm the convergent and discriminatory validity of our measure. 
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3. Individual differences in moral decision-making  
We have now set the stage for the analysis of studying individual differences that 
determine moral decision-making. Our primary focus is on the impact of four central 
personal characteristics: gender, intelligence, age and being a single child. These 
characteristics are plausibly exogenous with respect to individual morality and moral 
behavior, and thus allow for a causal interpretation of correlations and regression 
results. Figure 1 shows the effect of each individual characteristic on moral decision-
making. First, less intelligent people are more likely to act immorally. The figure shows 
results for the standardized general IQ score, i.e., the combined IQ measure for fluid 
and crystallized IQ, grouped in terciles of the IQ distribution. The differences are quite 
pronounced. While subjects in the first tercile display a killing rate of above 60%, the 
respective rate is only 54.3% for the second, and 44.0% for the third tercile, 
respectively. Overall, the correlation between IQ and willingness to kill rate is highly 
significant (Spearman rank correlation, p<0.01, two-sided). Second, men are more 
willing to engage in immoral behavior than women. While the fraction of women who 
are trading off life for money is 44.9%, the respective fraction is 61.8% for men. The 
difference is statistically significant at any conventional level (p<0.01, two-sample test 
of proportions, two-sided). Third, we find a weakly statistically significant effect of age 
(Spearman rank correlation, p<0.1, two-sided). The weak effect is not surprising given 
the fairly condensed age distribution typical for a student sample. Fourth, there is a 
striking difference between single children vs. subjects with siblings. While the share of 
willingness to agree to kill is 50.2% for the latter, the share for single children is 69.4% 
(p<0.01, two-sample test of proportions, two-sided). 
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Figure 1: Individual differences in moral decision making. Displayed are the fractions of 
individuals who are willing to agree to kill their mouse for ten euros. n=310, error bars show 
standard errors of the means (SEM). 
 
To determine the joint role of these four characteristics simultaneously, we estimated 
Probit regressions with an individual’s immorality as dependent variable. All 
regressions include treatment dummies. Column (1) in Table 3 reports the respective 
coefficients on IQ, gender, age and single children as explanatory variables. The 
resulting coefficient estimates show that the unconditional results remain robust, with 
the exception of age. Higher levels of intelligence are associated with higher moral 
standards. Likewise, women are significantly less willing to engage in morally 
problematic activity than men. The effect on age is positive but insignificant. Single 
children are significantly less moral in comparison to subjects with siblings.  
Column (2) adds further plausible correlates of moral decision-making, the degree of 
religiousness and being a vegetarian. These factors are potentially endogenous to 
moral dispositions, e.g., if the decision to become a vegetarian is driven by moral rather 
than health concerns. More religious people as well as vegetarians show significantly 
higher moral concerns. On average being a vegetarian reduces the willingness to kill 
by about 25%-points. Note that adding these attitudes leaves the coefficients of IQ, 
gender and single children basically unchanged. 
To rule out effects that are related to the paradigm but not to moral concerns, column 
(3) adds further controls. These include disposable income, having a pet and being 
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exposed to animal experiments. All results remain virtually unchanged (compare Table 
2). In sum, the descriptive results from Figure 2 are confirmed in a multivariate 
regression analysis. In addition we find significant effects for religiousness and being 
vegetarian.13  
 
 
 
Table 3: Individual differences in moral decision-making. Probit regression coefficient 
estimates (marginal effects), with binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 
euros (or less) vs. not willing to kill) as dependent variable and robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent-level, 
respectively. Additional controls in column (3) include disposable income, having a pet and 
being exposed to animal experiments. 
 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Focusing on the data from the individual treatments only, effects are overall very similar to 
effects in the overall data set, see Table A2 the Appendix for details. 
Average Marginal Effects after Probit Immorality (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
IQ score (standardized) -0.094*** -0.114*** -0.115*** 
 
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) 
Male 0.154*** 0.117** 0.129** 
 
(0.054) (0.053) (0.054) 
Age (in years) 0.009 0.009 0.010 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Single child 0.176*** 0.154** 0.157** 
 
(0.068) (0.067) (0.067) 
Religiousness (standardized) 
 
-0.071*** -0.071*** 
  
(0.026) (0.026) 
Vegetarian 
 
-0.248*** -0.251*** 
  
(0.079) (0.080) 
  
Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No Yes 
        
Log likelihood -190.29 -183.58 -182.94 
Observations 310 310 310 
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4. Interaction of personality and market institutions 
In the final step of the analysis, we investigate whether the effects of institutions on 
moral behavior are uniform or depend on individual characteristics. As discussed in 
Falk and Szech (2013a) willingness to agree to kill is much higher in the market 
environments than in individual decisions. The fact that treatment assignment was 
random implies that market trading causally increases morally problematic behavior. It 
remains open, however, whether markets affect all subjects in similar ways, or whether 
exposure to markets affects subgroups of the population differently. Nothing is known 
about possible individual specific effects of market institutions. Such an understanding, 
however, would be informative for policies designed to limit moral transgression. For 
example, it would allow targeting specific groups of traders and customers that have 
been identified to be particularly responsive to market exposure or participation. 
In order to simplify the analysis and to obtain sample sizes that allow testing for 
interactions of markets and individual characteristics, in the analysis we distinguish 
between treatment “Individual” (Individually Binary and Individually Price-List) on the 
one hand and treatment “Market” (Bilateral Market and Multilateral Market) on the other 
hand.14 In Individual, 44.5% (n=220) of the participants are willing to agree to kill their 
mouse for 10 euros. In Market, 74.4% (n=90) are willing to kill the mouse for 10 euros. 
The difference of 29.9 percentage points is highly significant (p < 0.001, two-sample 
test of proportions, two-sided). 
To explore how markets affect decision makers with different characteristics, we 
present multivariate between-subject-comparisons. In order to identify potential 
individual specific responses to institutional differences, we estimate models including 
interaction terms: 
𝐸 𝑦|𝑥! ,𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 1|𝑥! ,𝑑 = 𝐺 𝛽! +   𝛽!"#$!  𝑑 + 𝛽!  𝑥! + 𝛽!"#$!∗!   𝑑  𝑥!!!!!
!
!!! = 𝐺 𝐴  
Equation 1: Estimation model including interaction effects. 
 
where 𝑦 is the binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or 
less) vs. not willing to kill), 𝑥! with 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘 are the individual specific variables and 𝑑 
is a treatment dummy indicating Market vs. Individual treatment. 𝐺 𝐴  is, depending on 
the estimation method, either the identity function (𝐺 𝐴 = 𝐴, linear probability model) 
or the standard normal cumulative distribution function (𝐺 𝐴 = Ф 𝐴 , Probit). 
To identify potential individual specific responses to the market environment, we 
analyze cross derivatives with respect to individual characteristics and the treatment 
dummy 
!(!"[!|!!,!]/!!!!" . Estimation results concerning these interaction effects are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Note that the willingness to kill does neither differ within individual nor within market 
treatments (p > 0.6 respectively, two-sample test of proportions, two-sided). 
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presented in Table 4. Columns (1) and (2) present results of linear probability (OLS) 
models. In Column (1) the individual specific variables are IQ, gender, age and single 
child status. In Column (2) we add, as in Table 3, the correlates degree of religiousness 
and being a vegetarian. Columns (3) and (4) mirror Column (1) and (2) but are based 
on Probit estimations. In contrast to linear models, marginal effects and thereby 
interaction effects in nonlinear models as Probit vary by an individuals’ levels of all 
explanatory variables.15 For comparison to the OLS estimates and since we are 
interested in the general mechanism we focus on average interaction effects which are 
calculated as differences in average marginal effects (see Appendix A1 for details). 
          
 
 
Average interaction effects: !(!"[!|!!,!]/!!!!"  
 
Individual characteristics 𝑥!: OLS OLS Probit Probit 
	   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
	   	      
IQ score (std.) 0.015 0.003 -0.011 -0.029 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.059) (0.056) 
Male -0.071 -0.062 -0.083 -0.091 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.112) (0.110) 
Age (in years) 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.017 
 (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) 
Single child 0.047 0.068 0.063 0.119 
 (0.124) (0.119) (0.132) (0.117) 
Religiousness (std.)  -0.026  -0.023 
  (0.063)  (0.058) 
Vegetarian  -0.029  -0.104 
  (0.178)  (0.175) 
	  	   	  	         
Table 4: Average Interaction Effects of Individual Characteristics and Market 
treatment. Models are specified as described in Equation (1). Columns (1) and (2) are 
estimated using OLS, Columns (3) and (4) are estimated using Probit. The outcome 
variable is binary (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or less) vs. not 
willing to kill), robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1-percent, 5-percent and 10-percent-level, respectively. 
 
The interpretation of the coefficients is straightforward. A positive coefficient indicates 
that an increase (for continuous variables) in the certain characteristic implies on 
average an enforced moral-transgressing effect of the market. A negative coefficient 
indicates that an increase in the characteristic implies a weakened transgressing effect. 
But over both specifications and both estimation methods none of the average 
interaction effects is statistically significant different from zero at any conventional 
level16 which indicates that none of the characteristics under study protects from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See, e.g., the discussion in Green (2010). 
16 Smallest p-value concerns the interaction effect with single child status(p=0.310, two-sided t-
test)	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moral-eroding effect of markets -- with the notable exception of fluid intelligence. While 
both fundamental parts of general intelligence (fluid and crystalized) are related to 
moral decision making (see Table A3), only the fluid component shows an interaction 
effect with the market environment. Repeating e.g. the analysis as in Table 4 Column 
(4) but replacing the general IQ score by only the fluid component of intelligence results 
in a significant negative average interaction effect (p=0.073, two-sided t-test). This 
means fluid intelligence tends to attenuate the moral-transgressing effect of markets. 
The effect size of the interaction effect is -0.090 which means that on average if fluid 
intelligence increases by one standard deviation the moral transgression effect is 
reduced by about one third (compare to the 29.9 percentage points reported above).  
To explore the interaction between market environment and fluid intelligence in more 
detail we estimate kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions. This flexible 
nonparametric approach allows us to explore potential nonlinearities in the relations 
between morally problematic behavior, fluid intelligence and market environment. 
Graph A1 shows the results of regressions of morally problematic behavior on fluid 
intelligence separately for the Individual and the Market treatment. The estimations 
confirm the above presented results of a general reduced likelihood of willingness to 
agree to kill for more intelligent individuals and a pronounced moral transgression 
effect for less intelligent individuals in the market environment. Possibly, individuals 
with a higher fluid intelligence can better understand principles of markets and how 
these may facilitate acting in immoral, selfish ways (e.g., via diffusion of responsibility, 
social information, and shared guilt). Being aware of such market mechanisms may 
make it easier to resist the temptations markets provide. For example, understanding 
that one may tend to focus on prices and profits in markets (Vohs et al. 2006) or that 
markets provide social information that may render it easier to behave immorally as 
well could be key to behave in a more reflected way and stay moral.17 
With exception of fluid intelligence, none of the other characteristics that proved to 
correlate with moral behavior in the individual decision context turned out to protect 
significantly (on average) against moral decay in the market environments. This shows 
that markets can be very powerful tools causing moral transgression. Besides a high 
capacity in thinking logically and solving problems in novel situations as measured by 
the fluid intelligence score, we cannot identify any factor that helps to resist the 
influences of market trading. Females get equally seduced as males, individuals with 
siblings equally react as single children. Neither religiousness nor vegetarianism 
specifically help to overcome the market forces. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  For the impact of social information on social behavior, see, e.g., Weber et al. (2004).	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5. Concluding remarks 
Understanding determinants of morality is of central importance for the social sciences 
and for society as a whole. We identify in a real task individual differences as well as 
the institutional set-up as fundamental determinates of moral decision-making. Several 
characteristics, such as having siblings, a high crystallized or fluid intelligence, 
religiousness or being female, help staying moral in a real moral decision context. 
These characteristics contribute to higher moral standards – in individual decision-
making and in market environments. Therefore, our data suggest that a comparatively 
moral personality, a homo moralis, exists. 
Markets causally erode moral behavior, affecting many kinds of personalities to severe 
extents. This informs models of how institutions affect moral decision making: 
Populations display heterogeneous moral attitudes, but institutions can causally impact 
moral standards of most participants (Rothenhäusler et al. 2015). The fact that a high 
capacity in solving problems and thinking logically helps to partly overcome market 
forces may suggest that policy intervention or customer protection could try to make 
market mechanisms more transparent. For example, trading clothes, jewelry or 
electronics possibly involving the suffering of workers may be much easier seeing other 
people trading the same items, or if they know that others agree to the trade as well. 
Understanding that such social information can impact moral behavior could be a first 
step to overcome morally problematic effects of markets. 
It is also important to explore other contexts and trade-offs involving moral outcomes in 
order to gain a broader picture. Results may also vary depending on what kind of moral 
item is traded. Our study shows that market trading has the potential to reduce moral 
behavior in many different kinds of people. Social debate is necessary to decide 
whether we want to live in societies that expose individuals on a large scale to settings 
that make them reduce their moral standards -- or whether we need some form of 
protection or more transparency about such mechanisms. With regard to the 
omnipresence of markets as potential sources of seduction into naïve selfishness, the 
topic seems rather pressing. 
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Appendix 
A1: Average Marginal Effects after Probit 
Given the following model including interaction terms 
 
𝐸 𝑦|𝑥! ,𝑑 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏 𝑦 = 1|𝑥! ,𝑑 = Ф 𝛽! +   𝛽!"#$!  𝑑 + 𝛽!𝑥! + 𝛽!"#$!∗!  𝑑  𝑥!  !!!!
!
!!! = Ф 𝐴  
 
where 𝑦 is the binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or 
less) vs. not willing to kill), 𝑥! with 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝑘 are the individual specific variables, 𝑡 is a 
treatment dummy indicating market vs. individual treatment and Ф 𝐴  is the standard 
normal cumulative distribution function. To explore whether the effect of institutions on 
moral behavior is differs for individuals with certain characteristics we are interested in 
the interaction effects: 𝜕(𝛥𝐸[𝑦|𝑥!,𝑑]/𝛥𝑑𝜕𝑥! = 𝛥(𝜕𝐸[𝑦|𝑥!,𝑑]/𝜕𝑥!𝛥𝑑 = 𝛽! +   𝛽!"#$!∗! Ф! 𝐴 𝑑 = 1 −   𝛽!Ф! 𝐴 𝑑 = 0 . 
These can easily be calculated as differences in the marginal effects of the respective 
variables conditional on the market dummy being one, minus the marginal effects 
conditional on the dummy being zero18. The marginal effects and thereby the 
interaction effects depend on the individuals’ levels of all explanatory variables. Since 
we are interested in the general mechanism we focus on average interaction effects 
which are calculated by differences in average marginal effects. Estimation results are 
displayed in Table 4. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Estimations can easily be performed with standard statistical software, as e.g. Stata 13, in 
form of testing linear combinations of coefficients. 
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Additional Tables and Graphs 
              
Average Marginal Effects Probit Immorality (0/1) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Openness to Experience -0.069*** 
    
-0.062** 
 
(0.027) 
    
(0.027) 
Conscientiousness 
 
0.039 
   
0.038 
  
(0.027) 
   
(0.027) 
Extraversion 
  
-0.001 
  
0.023 
   
(0.027) 
  
(0.029) 
Agreeableness 
   
-0.106*** 
 
-0.117*** 
    
(0.028) 
 
(0.029) 
Neuroticism 
    
-0.033 -0.028 
     
(0.027) (0.029) 
       Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
              
Log likelihood -198.92 -201.15 -202.14 -194.25 -201.42 -188.79 
Observations 310 310 310 310 310 310 
       Table A1: Immoral Behavior and the Big Five. Probit regression estimates (marginal effects), 
with binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or less) vs. not willing 
to kill) as dependent variable and standard errors in parentheses. *** indicate significance at the 
1-percent-level. 
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Table A2: Individual differences in moral decision-making (only individual treatments). 
Probit regression estimates (marginal effects), with binary outcome (Immorality: Agreeing to kill 
the mouse for 10 euros (or less) vs. not willing to kill) as dependent variable and robust 
standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-percent, 5-percent and 
10-percent-level, respectively. Additional controls in column (3) include disposable income, 
having a pet and being exposed to animal experiments. 
 
 
  
Average Marginal Effects after Probit Immorality (0/1) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
IQ score (standardized) -0.091*** -0.108*** -0.110*** 
 
(0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
Male 0.169** 0.128* 0.134** 
 
(0.066) (0.066) (0.067) 
Age (in years) 0.005 0.006 0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
Single child 0.154* 0.120 0.119 
 
(0.091) (0.090) (0.090) 
Religiousness (standardized) 
 
-0.066** -0.068** 
  
(0.032) (0.032) 
Vegetarian 
 
-0.246*** -0.249*** 
  
(0.094) (0.093) 
  
Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Additional controls No No Yes 
        
Log likelihood -144.48 -140.37 -140.11 
Observations 220 220 220 
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Average Marginal Effects after Probit Immorality (0/1) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Fluid intelligence (standardized) -0.069*** -0.089*** 
  
	  
(0.026) (0.026) 
  Crystallized intelligence (standardized) 
  
-0.070** -0.075** 
	     
(0.031) (0.029) 
Male 0.157*** 0.122** 0.134** 0.098* 
	  
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Age (in years) 0.006 0.006 0.009 0.009 
	  
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Single child 0.179*** 0.157** 0.187*** 0.171** 
	  
(0.069) (0.067) (0.068) (0.067) 
Religiousness (standardized) 
 
-0.065** 
 
-0.058** 
	    
(0.027) 
 
(0.027) 
Vegetarian 
 
-0.253*** 
 
-0.217** 
	    
(0.080) 
 
(0.085) 
    
 Treatment dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
          
Log likelihood -192.44 -186.19 -192.92 -188.12 
Observations 310 310 310 310 
 
Table A3: Individual differences in moral decision-making (focusing on fluid and 
crystalized intelligence). Probit regression estimates (marginal effects), with binary outcome 
(Immorality: Agreeing to kill the mouse for 10 euros (or less) vs. not willing to kill) as dependent 
variable and robust standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1-
percent, 5-percent and 10-percent-level, respectively. 
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Graph A1: Fluid Intelligence and the probability to agree to kill for Individual and Market 
Treatment. This figure shows kernel-weighted local polynomial regressions using local-mean 
smoothing, Epanechikov kernels and bandwidth selections via the plug-in estimator of the 
asymptotically optimal constant bandwidth. 
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